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By now it is almost a clich6: "The very conservative Rehnquist
Supreme Court today issued a surprisingly liberal decision in which it
upheld the First Amendment claims of [fill in the description]." State-
ments like this characterize media commentary on recent Supreme Court
decisions.1 Yet, precisely because these statements are nearly cich6s,
surprise that the Court upholds First Amendment claims hardly seems
justified. In this Essay I examine two sources of the Court's predictabil-
ity. The first is doctrinal: The present Court finds the distinction be-
tween content-based and content-neutral regulations quite attractive;
some of its members, who might otherwise be interested in regulating
speech activities, are strongly drawn to "bright-line" rules. These doctri-
nal points combine to increase the probability that a state's attempt to
regulate some speech activities will be overturned. The second source of
the Court's predictability is political: Whether consciously or not, the
Justices understand that the respectable media 2 are one of their most im-
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank Tom
Krattenmaker and L. Michael Seidman for their comments on this Essay.
1. The following is a typical example of such statements:
The center held.
That was the story of this surprising and fascinating Supreme Court term, a
term that appeared only months ago to have all the makings of a conservative coun-
terrevolution ....
Addressing the First Amendment's free-speech guarantee in an unusually wide
variety of contexts, the Justices gave that guarantee an expansive interpretation....
[T]he term had a decidedly pro-speech tilt.
Linda Greenhouse, Slim Margin: Moderates on Court Defy Predictions, N.Y. TIMES, July 5,
1992, § 4, at 1.
2. It is difficult to define the "respectable" media precisely. The major broadcasting
networks must be included, along with their local affiliates. Major newspapers and magazines,
such as those included in standard library indexes, also are part of the respectable media.




portant constituencies, and they also understand that the respectable me-
dia, worried about the slippery slope of regulation, are nearly absolutists
on free speech issues.
None of this is to say that the present Court's First Amendment
rulings are "good" in the aggregate or "on balance liberal." By confining
my attention to claims of interest to the respectable media, I may have
narrowed the field so substantially that few (outside the respectable me-
dia) ought to be interested in the fact that the Court's rulings uphold
First Amendment claims. From other perspectives, the analysis may
mean only that the Supreme Court is not as bad as it could have been.
I. The Potent Combination of Free Speech Doctrine and
Legal Methodologies
Over the past decade the Supreme Court has reconceptualized free
speech law. The Warren Court began to organize free speech law around
a new set of concepts, but the modem law of the First Amendment crys-
tallized more recently. Today the central organizing concept of First
Amendment doctrine is the distinction between content-based regula-
tions and content-neutral ones.3
Content-based regulations are almost never constitutional. 4 Con-
tent-neutral regulations come to the Court with a strong presumption in
their favor, but that presumption can be overcome by a showing that the
benefits of allowing speech outweigh the harms averted by the
regulation. 5
The content-based/content-neutral distinction, as explicated by the
Court, immediately introduces a structural bias into First Amendment
doctrine. Virtually all content-based regulations will be invalidated, and
some content-neutral ones-those that fail the balancing test-will be in-
validated as well. From a litigating point of view, those who challenge a
regulation on free speech grounds have two chances (and those who de-
fend the regulation have two hurdles): They will try to show that the
regulation is content-based and, if they fail there, they will argue that the
3. The distinction emerged as a way to understand why the Court required a close
causal connection between speech and social harm in some cases but not in others. The cases
requiring a close causal connection as a prerequisite to regulation came to be seen as involving
content-based regulations. "Time, place, and manner" regulations lacking such a connection,
on the other hand, were so easily understood to be constitutional because, it came to seem,
they were content-neutral.
4. For a rare example of a decision upholding a content-based regulation, see Burson v.
Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992), discussed infra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
5. A good statement of this position, albeit in dissent, is Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,
111 S. Ct. 2513, 2522 (1991) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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regulation nonetheless fails the balancing test applied in cases involving
content-neutral regulations.
The initial decisions to treat cases as involving content-neutral or
content-based regulations, while not dispositive, clearly make a difference
in what the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence looks like.6 If the
Court found that nearly all the cases it decided involved content-neutral
regulations, its decisions would seem less protective of free speech than
they would if it found nearly all the cases to involve content-based regu-
lations. These categorization decisions have two dimensions. I take up
one dimension-the proportions of content-based and content-neutral
regulations generated by the political branches-in the next Part. The
other dimension is doctrinal. Analytically, placing a regulation in one
category rather than another is as arbitrary as any formalist exercise.
The difficulty lies in placing the regulation in its context: By defining the
context in one way, virtually any regulation can become content-based,
while defining the context in another way can make virtually any regula-
tion seem content-neutral.
Consider, for example, the recent "airport speech" cases. 7 Everyone
on the Court put them in the "content-neutral" category, though the
Justices divided over whether bans on solicitation and distribution of
literature survived the balancing test.8 Opponents of the regulations,
however, could have contended that airport solicitation bans are content-
based once we examine them in the wider social context in which reli-
gious denominations must attempt to gain support: Some denominations
find airport solicitation to be an essential mode of gaining support. By
banning airport solicitation, then, the government differentially disad-
vantages those denominations. While "content-neutral on [its] face," the
regulation has "sharply content-differential effects." 9 In that sense, and
in that context, the solicitation ban is content-based.
6. The definition of "content-neutral" therefore might be a matter of some concern.
The Court's definition of content-based regulations has varied. Sometimes it has said that such
regulations are "enacted for the purpose of restraining speech on the basis of its content," City
of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986), and has distinguished them from
content-neutral regulations that "are justified without regard to the content of the regulated
speech," id. at 48 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 771 (1976)). Sometimes it has said that content-based regulations can be identified
by examining whether the government seeks to suppress expression "out of concern for its
likely communicative impact." United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317 (1990).
7. E.g., International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).
8. Id at 2708-09; id at 2725-27 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting).
9. GEOFFREY R. STONE, Louis M. SEIDMAN, CAss R. SUNSTEIN & MARK V.
TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW supp. at 173 (2d ed. Supp. 1992).
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Comparable analytic maneuvers can convert regulations the Court
treats as content-based into regulations it could see as content-neutral.
In Burson v. Freeman, the Court treated Tennessee's ban on campaigning
within 100 feet of polling places to be "a facially content-based restric-
tion on political speech in a public forum" because it restricted
campaigning but not other speech activities. 10 By noting that other
speech activities are regulated elsewhere or in different ways, though, this
restriction can be placed in a broader setting, one in which speech activi-
ties more broadly seen are all-and therefore are neutrally-regulated.
Commercial solicitation is heavily regulated through billboard restric-
tions, limitations on advertising certain products, and the like. When
seen in this way, the seemingly content-based regulation of a specific
product like cigarettes becomes a subset of the legally relevant, and con-
tent-neutral, category of commercial advertising. Similarly, when we
view speech activities in this broader way, Tennessee's restriction on
campaigning near the polls becomes just one of a larger set of govern-
ment regulations of speech-a set that, taken as a whole, is neutral as to
the content of the regulated speech. " Nothing inherent in the distinction
between content-neutral and content-based regulations dictates the
choice between the narrow characterization, in which a single regulation
is surely content-based, and the broad one, in which the entire category is
content-neutral.
Sometimes the Court's refusal to engage in this analytic maneuver is
apparent on a case's surface. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minne-
sota Commissioner of Revenue invalidated a tax on the paper and ink
used in printing newspapers and magazines. 12 According to the Court,
this was a "special tax that applies only to certain publications protected
by the First Amendment."' 3 The selectivity was, in this setting, the ana-
logue to content-based regulation. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the
Court relied on the tax's details to obscure the central point, but Justice
Rehnquist's dissent made it clear that Minnesota was not imposing a tax
selectively on the press. Minnesota exempted newspapers from its sales
10. 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1851 (1992) (plurality opinion of Blackmun, J.). Three dissenting
Justices accepted this characterization but disagreed with the plurality's conclusion that the
regulation survived the requisite "strict scrutiny." Id. at 1861 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11. Or, as Justice Scalia did, we could define the public forum more narrowly by stressing
how extensively governments have regulated distribution of material near polling places. Id. at
1859-60 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Then, seeing the regulation in this different con-
text, we would place it outside the scope of the general content-based/content-neutral distinc-
tion. For additional discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 12-14.
12. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
13. Id. at 581.
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tax because collecting the tax would have been an administrative
nightmare. Instead, it taxed paper and ink, setting the rate to generate
roughly the amount of revenue that a sales tax on the newspapers would
have generated. 14 Of course, the general sales tax is a content-neutral
regulation that the state could freely impose on newspaper sales.
As Minneapolis Star makes clear, the Court does not routinely en-
gage in analytic maneuvers that demonstrate its freedom to call some-
thing content-neutral or content-based as it chooses (for other reasons).
Instead, it confines its attention to the statute or regulation at issue, with-
out examining the relation between that regulation and others. The con-
tent-based/content-neutral distinction is coherent, of course, only
because the Court closes its eyes to other regulations. Yet, the Court's
First Amendment doctrine does not explain why the Court has defined
the distinction in such an arbitrary way.
Indeed, the Court must decide to use the content-based/content-
neutral distinction in the first place. For, circling around that distinc-
tion, like Ptolemaic epicycles, are subsidiary distinctions among types of
speech. For example, commercial speech and sexually explicit speech are
treated differently. 15 As Geoffrey Stone has shown, the Court has avail-
able a large number of these subsidiary doctrines: A statute may be con-
tent-based and "viewpoint-based," in which case it might be
unconstitutional; it may be content-based but viewpoint-neutral, in
which case it might be constitutional; it may be content-based but consti-
tutional because it deals with a subject matter that the Court has said
may be highly regulated; different constitutional rules may apply to
speech activities in a true public forum, a dedicated public forum, or a
nonpublic forum. 16 Justice Blackmun's formulation in Burson is re-
vealing-note the four categories listed when he calls the statute "a
facially content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum"; 17
had one or more categories been different, the doctrinal test would have
differed too.
What might account for the Court's choices? Doctrinally, when a
statute regulates only speech-that is, is content-based-we may com-
fortably presume that enforcing the statute will impair First Amendment
values; the only question should be whether the presumption is over-
14. Id. at 601-03 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
15. The Court's recent hate-speech decision shows that the content-based/content-neu-
tral distinction retains force even for the analysis of speech that the Court concedes has low
social value. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
16. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI L. REV. 46 (1987).
17. 112 S. Ct. at 1851 (plurality opinion of Blackmun, J.) (emphases added).
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come. 18 Further, the distinction presents itself to the Court as implicat-
ing pre-analytic categories. Such categories, in turn, characterize
formalist ways of thinking. And, by confining attention to the regulation
at issue, the Court defines the distinction to create a "bright-line" rule,
another characteristically formalist move.
The content-based/content-neutral distinction, as the Court has de-
fined it, thus reflects the Court's attraction to formalism. Justice Scalia
has notoriously defended formalism, 19 but other Justices find it attractive
as well.20 In addition to individual Justices' responses to formalism, the
notion of the Constitution as enforceable law supports formalism,
although it does not require it. But the Court's preference for formalism
does not, in itself, lead the Court to reach particular types of results. As
Kathleen Sullivan has shown, there is no necessary connection between
formalism and conservatism.
21
Beyond the role of formalism, of course, lies the possibility of ma-
nipulation at the point when the Court defines "content-based" and
"content-neutral." As the Court defines them, the terms may themselves
be determinate, but the choice of definition is not. In the analogous area
of race discrimination law, for example, the Court has defined "facially
neutral" in a way that insulates most regulations generated by the polit-
ical process from serious constitutional attack. If it defines "content-neu-
tral" in a way that allows substantially more First Amendment
challenges, one would look for an explanation.
The doctrinal structure of the Court's First Amendment decisions,
in sum, divides regulations into two categories. For content-based regu-
lations, the Court applies a "rule" of near-certain invalidation; for con-
tent-neutral ones, the Court balances competing interests. Formalist
18. The Minneapolis Star Court was correct, on this view, to define the statute as content-
based; its mistake was to treat the presumption as conclusive, without addressing Justice
Rehnquist's cogent demonstration that the newspapers' exemption from the sales tax ought to
have rebutted the presumption.
19. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHi. L. REV. 1175
(1989). For a discussion of Justice Scalia's formalism, see George Kannar, The Constitutional
Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297 (1990).
20. Justice Kennedy provided an example of formalism's influence in explaining why he
was among the five Justices voting to hold flag-burning statutes unconstitutional in Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). Although the dissenters "advance[d] powerful arguments"
against that conclusion, Justice Kennedy said, the majority was enforcing the simple meaning
of the First Amendment. Id. at 421 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The incongruity of such for-
malism could not escape him, however: even as he insisted that the Constitution required the
result he was voting for, Justice Kennedy admitted that "[t]he outcome can be laid at no door
but ours." Id. at 420 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
21. Kathleen Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules
and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992).
[Vol. 44HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
THE COURT'S FREE SPEECH CONSTITUENCY
judges, however, are likely to be uncomfortable with balancing. They
could avoid balancing either by characterizing regulations as content-
based, thus invalidating most of them, or by establishing what Elliot
Mincberg calls in this Symposium a prior restraint on First Amendment
analysis, foregoing entirely the enterprise of constitutional analysis by
placing the regulation outside the scope of the Amendment.
22
My argument requires that the Court not deploy these prior re-
straints on First Amendment analysis too often. Why, though, would a
conservative Court be reluctant to do so? Perhaps such restraints call for
too much doctrinal innovation. Or perhaps we should look outside the
sphere of legal doctrine. The next Part of this Essay suggests how a
political scientist might account for the Court's choices, to the extent
they are not doctrinally determined.
IH. The Court's Free Speech Constituency
Political scientists who study the Court illuminatingly treat it as a
political institution, although it is not quite respectable for constitutional
lawyers to do the same.23 And, as they do with other political institu-
tions, political scientists describe the Court's constituencies-the groups
to which it is responsive. Constitutional lawyers can understand what
political scientists mean when they describe a legislator's constituen-
cies-the groups whose support is necessary to ensure the legislator's re-
election. But, constitutional lawyers might think, surely Supreme Court
Justices, with life tenure, need not appeal to constituencies. This as-
sumption, however, misconceives the proximate source of the need for
constituency support with its ultimate source.
Legislators need support to be reelected, but the desire for reelection
is not a primal impulse. Rather, legislators want to be reelected because
reelection is essential if they are to accomplish what they want; they may
want to promote the public interest or feather their own nests, but they
will be unable to do either if they are thrown out of office. On this view,
legislators divide what they do into two parts: what they do to satisfy
their constituencies, and what they do to serve their own goals. Some-
times, legislators are in a happy situation in which what they indepen-
dently want to do will also satisfy their constituencies. Sometimes, they
are in a less happy situation in which, to accomplish what they most
22. Elliot Mincberg, A Look at Recent Supreme Court Decisions: Judicial Prior Restraint
and the First Amendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 871 (1993).
23. My general approach has been influenced by my perhaps idiosyncratic reading of
MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1981).
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want to do, they must "pander" to their constituencies by doing some-
thing that, reelection concerns aside, they would rather not do.
So too with Supreme Court Justices. They need support from their
constituencies if they are to accomplish what they want. The "happy"
situation for a Justice occurs when he or she shares the values of an im-
portant constituency. Then, by enacting the Justice's preferences into
law, the Justice simultaneously satisfies the constituency. 24 The present
Court's approach to First Amendment issues might be an example of the
happy convergence of values and constituency interests. The clich6 with
which this Essay opened notes the convergence, but the surprise it ex-
presses suggests that observers do not believe the convergence to be
happy. Yet, if the present Court's values diverge from those prevalent in
the respectable media, why does the convergence in results occur?
Because of the way the Justices do things, the respectable media are
an important constituency. The Justices surely receive some ego gratifi-
cation from having their names mentioned favorably in the respectable
media, but I doubt this is a major reason for their treatment of the re-
spectable media as one of the Court's important constituencies. Rather,
the Justices are interested in the respectable media not so much for ego
gratification, or because they need media support on matters of interest
to the media, but because the Justices need media support-or at least
need to reduce media opposition-to accomplish their other projects. 25
Again, the analogy to legislators is helpful. As legislators do, the
Justices may have to give something to one constituency in order to make
it easier to do something else the Justices regard as more important. The
Supreme Court "makes law," in the sense that it articulates its vision of
what the Constitution requires and purports to give that vision the force
of government authority. But the directly coercive impact of Supreme
24. The Burger Court's development of "intermediate scrutiny" for gender-based classifi-
cations may be the best recent example. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The
members of that Court differed somewhat from each other in their values, some preferring to
promote the interests of middle-class women, others with a wider vision of women's interests.
But these values converged to support at least the "intermediate scrutiny" test. And, happily,
the Justices' values found support in the second wave of the women's movement in the 1970s.
(As this example suggests, difficulties may arise when the constituency's values change while
the Justices' either remain the same or change in a different direction. Then, what used to be a
supportive constituency can become a hostile one.)
25. Note that the Court needs direct political support for some things it does. In particu-
lar, the political branches control the amenities of life on the Court-the amount of staff sup-
port, for example. And, as Tom Krattenmaker pointed out in commenting on a draft of this
Essay, the President can make life easier for the Justices by appointing able and congenial,
rather than incompetent and confrontational, Justices.
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Court decisions is limited to parties to lawsuits.26 For the Court's nor-
mative vision to become embedded in society, it has to be disseminated in
a reasonably sympathetic way.
That is how the respectable media become an important constitu-
ency for the Court. In those media-the evening news, leading newspa-
pers, weekly news magazines-the Court's decisions are crisply
summarized and distributed to wide audiences. Media editors, of course,
have substantial control over how to present Supreme Court decisions. 27
Consider two possible leads for a story reporting a decision that refused
to overturn a death sentence. The first is, "Continuing its recent trend to
cut off review of death sentences, the Supreme Court today refused to
halt the execution of Robert Alton Harris, the first person executed in
California in decades." The second is, "The Supreme Court today up-
held the death sentence of Robert Alton Harris, convicted fifteen years
ago of the brutal murders of two teen-aged boys in California." I believe
that, although the matter would not be high on their priority lists, the
Justices who voted to uphold the death sentence, necessarily a majority
of the Court, would prefer the second lead to the first.
Professionalism places some limits on how reporters and editors
write leads, but those limits are broad enough that the choice between
the first lead and the second might sometimes be affected by how sympa-
thetically the reporter and editor view the Court's work overall. And
that, in turn, is likely to be substantially affected by how well the Court
has treated the concerns of the respectable media. Accordingly, Justices
who want to accomplish things outside the First Amendment arena have
an interest in satisfying the respectable media inside that arena. By doing
so, they make it more likely that their activities outside the First Amend-
ment will be reported in a sympathetic light-or, again, make it less
likely that their activities will be reported unsympathetically-thereby
making it more likely that their vision of the just society will be promul-
gated in a sympathetic way, and ultimately making it more likely that
that vision will be more widely accepted.
Treating the respectable media as an important constituency for the
Court makes sense of much of the Court's First Amendment jurispru-
dence. This is obviously true of libel law, despite occasional cries from
26. This is not to say that the direct coercive impact is insignificant; consider, as the most
dramatic example, cases in which the Court upholds a death sentence.
27. The "spin doctors" representing interest groups that pay attention to the Court also
have some control over how the media will present a decision. And, of course, media editors
can structure their responses by determining which of these to treat as objective observers and
which to treat as spin doctors.
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some quarters that the press would be better off if the Court overruled
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny.28 Compared to the pre-
Sullivan legal regime, the respectable media clearly benefit from the sub-
stantive libel rules the Court has put in place. 29 Yet, continued press
concern about this question suggests that the Court will continue to re-
strict the scope of the media's liability for libel.
Two other examples of the Court's responsiveness to the interests of
the respectable media appear in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine30 and
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.31 In Masson the Court defined the circum-
stances under which the press could be held liable for "false quota-
tions"-for falsely indicating through the use of quotation marks that a
person's own words were being reproduced. 32 In Cohen the Court held
that a newspaper could be held liable for breaching a promise of confi-
dentiality made to a source.3
3
In both cases the Court entertained the possibility that the press
would be financially liable for its actions, a course arguably inconsistent
with the interests of the respectable media. On closer examination, how-
ever, the cases are consistent with my argument in this Essay. As press
commentary after the decisions indicated, no one in the respectable me-
dia thought the reporters and editors in the cases behaved professionally
if they did what the lawsuits alleged they had done. 34 And, particularly
in Masson, the evidentiary hurdles to establishing liability seem substan-
tial enough that the respectable press could reasonably view the decisions
as victories, as decisions by the Supreme Court that insulated profession-
ally defensible conduct against liability.35
28. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For critical commentaries, see Symposium, Defamation and the
First Amendment: New Perspectives, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (1984), and ANTHONY
LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 200-31 (1991).
29. The only real issue is whether the Court has structured libel law so that the costs of
litigating libel cases under the modem regime are too great. In this context, however, "too
great" has a precise meaning. The press ought to compare what libel law cost it under the old
regime-with arguably lower litigating costs but significantly higher outlays on the merits be-
cause the press received less substantive protection-to what it costs under the new regime-
with enhanced substantive protection and arguably higher litigating costs. I know of no relia-
ble estimate indicating that the costs of the modern regime are too great in this sense.
30. 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
31. 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
32. 111 S. Ct. at 2429.
33. 111 S. Ct. at 2523.
34. See, e.g., Stuart Taylor, Jr., 1st Amendment Peril. Bad Issues Making Worse Law,
N.J. L.J., Aug. 29, 1991, at 66 (stating Masson involved a "gross breach-or alleged breach-
of journalistic ethics"; newspaper's action in Cohen was "contrary to widely accepted princi-
ples of journalistic ethics").
35. See 111 S. Ct. at 2431-34.
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The "public access" cases similarly support my general argument
here. From the Pentagon Papers case36 to Florida Star v. B.J.F,37 the
Supreme Court has made it extremely difficult, and arguably impossible,
for the government to regulate the dissemination of information-even
information compiled by the government itself-that the press manages
to get its hands on. Further, even within the confines of what the prece-
dents might allow, attempts to regulate dissemination are likely to be so
controversial that public officials will almost never seriously try to
regulate.
38
The effect of politics on the mix of cases the Court considers can be
seen in another part of the "public access" package, involving public ac-
cess to government processes. No one thinks that the ordinary opera-
tions of legislatures and executives can be closed to the press. Political
officials rarely try to do so, because they would face substantial public
criticism, fueled of course by the press, if they did.39 The law of govern-
ment openness has been made in cases involving courtroom closures, be-
cause the judges who close their courtrooms are less political than
legislators or executives. After an initial decision seeming to suggest that
access could be restricted,4° the Court has repeatedly forced courtrooms
to be open except when some rather restrictive conditions are met.41 The
Court has not given the respectable media everything they might want;
although it has upheld the constitutionality of broadcasting courtroom
proceedings, 42 for example, it has not decided that proceedings open to
print reporters must be open to broadcasting as well.43 The modern law
of government openness, however, is substantially more responsive to
36. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
37. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
38. The government did not emerge unscathed from the controversy over the Progressive
magazine's attempt to publish information about the construction of fusion bombs, for exam-
ple. For an overview, see L.A. Powe, Jr., The H-Bomb Injunction, 61 U. COLO. L. Rav. 55
(1990).
39. The "broadcast-print" distinction requires that this be qualified; it is not clear that
the Court would hold unconstitutional a congressional decision to end broadcasting of Con-
gress's proceedings. Still, it bears noting that the political pressures in favor of continuing
access once it has started are so substantial that the Court might think it proper to treat the
initial decision as creating a constitutional rachet.
40. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (refusing to find a Sixth Amend-
ment right of press or public access to pretrial hearings on motions to suppress evidence).
41. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (finding a First Amend-
ment right of access to trials themselves, with numerous separate opinions suggesting that
DePasquale would be severely limited); see also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464
U.S. 501 (1984) (finding First Amendment violation when voir dire of prospective jurors was
closed).
42. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
43. Reporters for the broadcaster media must, of course, be admitted to such courtrooms
media interests than it could have been-or than it was during the era of
the "liberal" Warren Court.44
More generally, the Court is constrained to some degree by what the
political branches generate. When the government regulates in a con-
tent-neutral manner, it necessarily regulates both the media and some
other interest groups. The respectable media have some political power,
which they can use to develop a coalition with other groups to oppose
content-neutral regulations that they all find troublesome. If the media
are isolated, in contrast, they may find themselves outvoted and unable to
put together a coalition to block the enactment of the regulation they
oppose. The political process, then, may generate regulations that "iso-
late" the media at a higher rate than the rate at which it generates
broader ones. Regulations that "isolate" the media, though, are precisely
what the Court calls "content-based." When the Court applies the con-
tent-based/content-neutral distinction to the range of First Amendment
cases it decides, it is therefore likely to render a fair number of decisions
supporting the respectable media.
The politics of free speech also affects the Court's responsiveness to
the respectable media. Sometimes the Court's attempts to satisfy one
constituency alienate another.45 Free speech cases, though, do not sys-
tematically counterpose the respectable media to some other organized
interest group. Sometimes free speech interests stand against the inter-
ests of state governments as regulators or property owners. The core
example is the typical public forum case. And, notably, as Larry Alexan-
der's contribution to this Symposium shows, the Court has been more
tempered in responding to free speech claims in these cases. 46 But cases
directly implicating the respectable media tend to be different. Libel and
privacy cases typically pit private parties against the media. Standing
against the media is only the states' abstract interest in developing their
own law. Were this conflict to arise in some neutral but political arena,
on the same terms that print reporters are, but they need not be allowed to broadcast the
proceedings themselves.
44. For example, Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), a Warren Court decision, suggested
that allowing television broadcasts of trials would typically violate a defendant's constitutional
rights.
45. Consider, for example, the way in which judicial responsiveness to specific women's
interests can generate opposition from business groups.
46. Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech and
Free Speech Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 921 (1993). The state action doctrine stands as a bar-
rier to asserting free speech claims directly against private property. In interpreting speech-
related statutes, however, the Court has been more accommodating to property interests. See,
e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992) (allowing employers to bar nonemployee
union organizers from their property)
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we would expect the relatively well-organized media interests to tend to
prevail over the relatively less organized governmental interests. When it
arises in the judicial arena, the outcome is the same.
The argument that the Supreme Court will tend to be responsive to
the interests of the respectable media must, however, be qualified in sev-
eral ways. First, the Court has not been, and does not seem likely to be,
sympathetic to the commercial interests of the respectable media, as dis-
tinguished from their editorial interests. It has upheld federal restrictions
on the ability of newspapers to own television and radio outlets, for ex-
ample.47 Its decision in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on
Human Relations upheld an ordinance barring newspapers from listing
employment advertisements in gender categories.48 The Minneapolis
Star newspaper tax case may, however, be a harbinger of the future.49
More generally, of course, the Court has explicitly given commercial
speech a lower level of protection than it gives political, or in this context
editorial, speech.50
Qualifying my argument by distinguishing between commercial and
editorial interests does not, I believe, substantially undermine its force.
Editors and reporters insist that their professional norms require them to
ignore the commercial implications of their reporting. 51 One need not
believe that this "Chinese Wall" between editorial and commercial de-
partments is impregnable to think that editors and reporters will be more
sensitive, on the margins, to the Court's decisions about editorial matters
than to its decisions about commercial matters. If the Court is suffi-
ciently responsive to the media's editorial interests, it may elicit the sup-
port it seeks from editorial departments even while it allows impairments
of the media's commercial interests. Of course, if the Court goes too far
in allowing regulation of those commercial interests-if, for example, the
Court upholds regulations that put the economic viability of the enter-
prise in question-editorial departments will begin to lose confidence in
the Court. The Court does not seem to have come close to that point,
however.
A second qualification to my general argument follows from the
now-standard distinction between the First Amendment protections af-
47. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
48. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
49. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575
(1985), discussed supra text accompanying notes 12-14.
50. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. New York Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557 (1980).
51. See Jason P. Isralowitz, Comment, The Reporter as Citizen: Newspaper Ethics and
Constitutional Values, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 221 (1992).
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forded the respectable print media and those afforded the broadcast me-
dia. Most dramatically, the Court has upheld regulations requiring the
broadcast media to be "fair" in their treatment of public issues, giving a
right of reply to public figures attacked over the air, and barring radio
stations from broadcasting "offensive" material at particular times, while
striking down attempts to impose similar but more modest duties on
print media.5 2 This distinction cannot easily be accommodated within
this Essay's overall argument.5 3
Two possibilities, though, deserve to be explored. First, perhaps all
the respectable media require from the Court is rough, "on balance
favorable" support for their interests. Identifying areas in which the
Court rejected the media's claims would then not, in itself, undermine
my argument; one would need to show that the Court had not promoted
the respectable media's interests in general, taking all the Court's deci-
sions into account. 54 Second, suppose the respectable media, both print
and broadcast, have come to see the differential treatment as aberra-
tional, the legacy of an era when the Court did not understand how
broadcast media worked-and, perhaps, of the pre-cable era when it
seemed cogent to argue that the scarcity of broadcast opportunities justi-
fied government regulation. 55 The respectable media would then assume
that these decisions had no continuing precedential force; indeed, they
might think they could readily push the precedents' limits without fear of
further regulation. On this view, they would believe that the Court
would respond to the editorial interests even of the broadcast media in
the future.
56
52. Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding FCC's
"fairness doctrine" for broadcasters) and FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (up-
holding FCC's ban on broadcasting of "offensive" or "indecent" (but not obscene) language
over the radio during certain hours when children might be listening) with Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating right-to-reply statute for newspa-
pers) and Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957) (invalidating statute that prohibited all
publication, distribution, and sale of reading material that is inappropriate for children).
53. It seems to me undesirably "ad hoe" to salvage the argument by suggesting that the
Court may find the respectable broadcast media somewhat less respectable than the respectable
print media.
54. 1 find this attempt to salvage the argument unattractive as well, because it seems so ad
hoc and flexible that the argument itself, supplemented by this qualification, becomes
uninteresting.
55. See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Comment, The Fairness Doc-
trine Today: A Constitutional Curiosity and an Impossible Dream, 1985 DUKE L.J. 151. Note
particularly the first phrase in the subtitle of this article.
56. In October 1992, the FCC fined a Los Angeles radio station $105,000 for "repeated,
indecent broadcasts" of Howard Stem's radio show. Edmund L. Andrews, Howard Stern Is
the Object of F.C.C. Fine, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1992, at C20. The validity of the fine has not.
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If this is how the "broadcast-print" distinction can be accommo-
dated to this Essay's general argument, it opens two other important
lines of analysis. The suggestion, put in more general terms, is that the
respectable media will be relatively unconcerned with Supreme Court de-
cisions upholding government regulation even of editorial processes if
three conditions are met: First, the decisions must have receded into the
past; second, they must have a well-defined and limited domain; and
third, they must be perceived as having no continuing precedential force
outside their limited domain. Under these conditions, editors will believe
that prior decisions are likely to be limited to their precise facts, and that
they can make editorial decisions today unaffected by what the courts
have done in the past. The first condition is simply the translation to the
present context of the well-known political maxim that what a politician
has done recently counts much more heavily than what he or she has
done in the past. The other two remove decisions rejecting the respecta-
ble media's First Amendment claims from the cognitive map of today's
editors and reporters.
Probably the best example of this way of dealing with such decisions
is the contemporary status of the Court's "reporter confidentiality" deci-
sion.57 Intensely controversial at the time, the decision refused to give
reporters any special protection in the criminal investigation process. It
appears to have had little effect on reporting, however. 58 Moreover, the
decision was extremely close; Justice Powell, who cast the deciding vote,
indicated that he was quite unsure about the decision's reach.59 Thus,
even in formal terms, the decision's precedential force is rather limited.
A second example involves the less respectable media. I have con-
tinually referred to the respectable media in this Essay, but what of First
Amendment claims made by other media enterprises? Concerned about
the possibility that government power might be deployed against them,
the respectable media start with the presumption that First Amendment
absolutism is the most desirable course for society to pursue. They pre-
as of this writing, been decided by any court. How the courts resolve the case may indicate
whether earlier restrictive decisions will have only limited precedential value.
57. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
58. Many states have enacted "shield" laws to protect reporters against intrusive inquir-
ies into confidentially obtained information. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp.
1993); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1993). Other states have
adopted such rules by judicial decision. See, eg., Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1976);
Dallas Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Mouer, 533 S.W.2d 70 (rex. Civ. App. 1976). Of course, one can
never know which investigations reporters did not pursue, or did not pursue so vigorously,
because of their inability to assure sources of complete confidentiality.
59. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasizing "the limited nature
of the Court's holding").
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sume that no regulation whatever of any media ought to be allowed, be-
cause upholding one form of regulating the less respectable media might
generate precedents, and an attitude of mind, that could be used to sup-
port regulating the respectable media. Still, the respectable media know
that some regulation of their less respectable counterparts is inevitable;
society will simply not put up with some types of speech activity, like
hard-core or child pornography. The question, then, is how to reconcile
the respectable media's presumptive absolutism with their acceptance of
some regulation.
The answer again lies in treating permissible regulation as involving
narrow and well-defined exceptions to an otherwise absolutist regime.
Here I think it useful to contrast the respectable media's treatment of
obscenity prosecutions and their treatment of Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell.60 The respectable media will sometimes criticize unusual or "ex-
cessive" efforts to suppress hard-core pornography, 61 but they live, per-
haps somewhat uncomfortably, with normal enforcement. The reason is
that normal enforcement occurs within well-defined boundaries-and
unusual enforcement efforts do not. The respectable media are not con-
cerned, of course, that they would be the targets of obscenity prosecu-
tions; their professional norms steer them far away from reproducing
material that could be prosecuted under existing First Amendment stan-
dards. Rather, they are concerned about "breaching the dike": If gov-
ernment officials get used to the idea that they can do something outside
the boundaries of clearly defined exceptions to First Amendment absolu-
tism, they might develop other regulations that would impinge directly
on the respectable media.
That is why Hustler Magazine v. Falwell mattered so much to the
respectable media. News reports on the case showed no sympathy
whatever for Larry Flynt or for the parody he published about Jerry
Falwell's first sexual experience. 62 The respectable media were intensely
concerned, however, that the Court not carve out any new exception to
First Amendment absolutism: Obscenity was one thing, but liability for
intentional infliction of emotional distress by means of a parody was
something entirely new, and for that reason alone had to be opposed.
60. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
61. See, e.g., Robert F. Howe, Henry Hudson: No Breaks, No Regrets, WASH. POST, May
27, 1991, at B1 (profiling an aggressive anti-pornography prosecutor). For a judicial reaction
to and restriction on innovative prosecutorial techniques in obscenity prosecutions, see United
States v. P.H.E., Inc., 965 F.2d 848 (10th Cir. 1992).
62. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, JERRY FALWELL V. LARRY FLYNT: THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT ON TRIAL 177-78 (1988) (describing initial reluctance of major media organizations to
intervene as amici curiae on Hustler's behalf).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44
April 1993] THE COURT'S FREE SPEECH CONSTITUENCY 897
Rigid rules and well-defined exceptions bring us back to the issue of
formalism. Formalists can get a lot of mileage out of the rhetoric of the
rule of law when they selectively invoke their formalism to support the
respectable media. When Justices Scalia and Kennedy receive praise for
adhering to the First Amendment's formal requirements (as they and the
respectable media see them) in the face of their presumed policy prefer-
ences in the flag-burning cases, for example, they are given some freedom
to act rather less formalistically when they contribute to the revision of
the law of habeas corpus.
63
The present Supreme Court is likely to support the First Amend-
ment claims of the respectable media for a final reason. First Amend-
ment claims can be divided into two rough categories. The first includes
claims by dissidents, who lack both political and social power, seeking to
resist majoritarian efforts to suppress dissent. Many of the classic free
speech cases fall into this category.64 Notably, however, the modern free
speech era has not seen a traditional subversive advocacy prosecution,
with the exception of the embarrassing and ultimately unsuccessful pros-
ecutions of Dr. Benjamin Spock and his co-defendants during the Viet-
nam War.
65
The second category of First Amendment claims is a more modern
one. Here a political majority seeks to control speech by people or
groups with substantial social power but with less than a majority in
political power.66 Because real political power flows in substantial mea-
sure from social power, cases in these categories are less common. Nu-
merical majorities must realize the strength of their numbers and
mobilize themselves before they can offset the political power of those
with social power. Uncommon as successful mobilizations of this sort
63. See, eg., Walter Isaacson, O'er the Land of the Free, TIME, July 3, 1989, at 14.
64. Steven Shiffrin has called this the Emersonian tradition in free speech adjudication.
STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRsT AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 78, 93-94,
141, 143 (1990).
65. See United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969). By "subversive advocacy"
cases, I means prosecutions for uttering words that the prosecution contends will undermine
popular support for the government. Until the modem era, those seeking to preserve the sta-
tus quo believed such prosecutions to be an important component of social self-defense. Now,
in contrast, they seem to have learned that such prosecutions undermine their position at least
as much as they protect it. And, by demonstrating that the beneficiaries of the status quo
distribution of power tolerate dissent because, they say, they are confident that dissent will
never be effective in displacing the status quo, they may actually stabilize the status quo more
effectively than subversive advocacy prosecutions would.
66. See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (1986).
may be, they sometimes occur. Recent efforts to regulate campaign fi-
nance, sexually explicit material, and hate speech fall into this category. 67
A conservative Court and the respectable media are both likely to be
hostile to regulations in the second category. Regulations here address
the free speech consequences of the existing distribution of social power.
So, for example, some proponents of more extensive regulation of sexu-
ally explicit material may argue that the "market" for sexually explicit
material results from the distribution of social power between men and
women. The material imposes costs on women who lack the social
power to combat its effects. But because the market for sexually explicit
material is treated (by those with social power) as outside the "public"
sphere, just like other markets, the distribution of sexually explicit mater-
ials appears to occur without state action-that is, outside the system of
regulation controlled by constitutional norms.
The free speech consequences of status quo distributions of social
power occur "without" regulation and so, on this view, raise no constitu-
tional questions. Only when a political majority mobilizes to adjust the
free speech consequences of status quo distributions of social power will a
free speech "issue" arise. The respectable media, themselves the benefi-
ciaries of the status quo distribution of social power, will be uncomforta-
ble with such attempts. A conservative Supreme Court will naturally be
uncomfortable with those attempts as well; that is precisely what makes
it a conservative Court. When the government makes such an attempt,
then, the Court will probably invalidate it, for example by characterizing
its limitations on the speech that emanates from the existing social struc-
ture as impermissible "viewpoint discrimination. ' 68 Here the court is in
the happy situation, mentioned earlier, in which its policy inclinations
coincide with an important constituency's interests. The state action
doctrine is the vehicle that authorizes challenges to majoritarian efforts
to regulate the consequences of the distribution of social power, while
making it impossible to use the Constitution directly to regulate those
consequences.
Conclusion
I do not want to overstate my general argument by suggesting what
is obviously untrue, that the present Supreme Court has upheld all First
Amendment claims made to it. And, of course, my argument has some
67. It bears noting, however, that these efforts have been far more successful in putting
the possibility of regulation on the agenda than they have been in getting regulations adopted.
68. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd mem.,
475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
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flexibility in its specification of the interests of the respectable media.
Still, I believe that I have shown why the clich with which this Essay
opened should be withdrawn from discussions of the Supreme Court and
the First Amendment. It is not at all surprising that a conservative
Supreme Court regularly upholds First Amendment claims.

